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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------------------------- ------------------LORNA M. ALDER SOFFE, aka
LORNA M. ALDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.

Case No.

17342

DONALD BIAINE RIDD and
NANCY M. RIDD, his wife,

Defendants-Respondents

BRIEF

OF

RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an unlawful detainer case brought by plaintiffappellant to obtain possession of real property sold under a
modified Uniform Real Estate Contract, and with a counterclaim
seeking to avoid a forfeiture of all monies paid as unconscionable.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants-respondents were granted judgment on their
counterclaim in the amount of $15,897.19. Appellant's motion for
a new trial was denied.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendants seek an affirmance of the tr1·a1 Judge's;,
·
•t.,
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendants are in disagreement with substantial port:i
the Statement of Facts set forth in plaintiff's brief.
On March 10, 1978, plaintiff Soffe and defendants Ric

entered into a modified Uniform Real Estate Contract where.I

plaintiff agreed to sell and defendants agreed to purcha~ei
home and lot at 1341 East Creek Road, Sandy, Utah,
of $57 ,500.00 ( Exh. 1 and

for tnel

Tr. 125). That contract provi,,j

for a down payment of $16, 500. 00, monthly payments of i11:I
commencing on April 10, 1978 and continuing thereafter

uni

March 10, 1979, and a balloon payment of no less than

irn:

and no more than $16, 500. 00 on March 10, 1979 ( Exh. l), ·
contract pro<1ided for possession to be deli<1ered to defen:.
on March 10, 1978, and for interest on the unpaid princit<:
balance at the rate of nine and one-half (9~%) percent per
from and after March 10, 1978 ( Exh. 1). The contract was:
pared by plaintiff who was represented by counsel ( Tr. i;:

179). Defendants were not represented by counsel duringneJ

tiations on the contract ( Tr. 178). The property was notl
and there was no real estate commission ( Tr. 197).

!

I

. ntiff pursUllnt :i
Defendants made a down payment to Plal
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the contract in the amount of $16,500.00

(Tr. 126 and 179),

and thereafter made thirteen consecutive monthly payments to
plaintiff in the amount of $325.00 each (Tr. 128). Monthly
payments made by defendants totaled $4,225.00, and all payments
made by defendants on the contract totaled $20,725.00 ( Tr. 126
and 128). Defendants were unable and failed to make that balloon
payment of no less than $10,250.00 due on March 10, 1979 ( Tr. 128)
Defendants were in possession of the premises

at 1341 East

Creek Road, Sandy, Utah, from March 10, 1978 until June 20, 1979
(Tr. 127 and 190). The fair rental value of the premises at 1341
East CreekRoad, Sandy, Utah, during the time of possession by
defendants was $325.00 per month for

fifteen months and ten days

or a total of $4, 983. 22 ( Tr. 194 and 214 ) .
The fair market value of the premises at 1341 East Creek
Road, Sandy, Utah, on March 10, 1978 was $57,500. (Tr. 165 and R.
30 at Interog. No. 7).

On June 20, 1979, the property was in

better condition and worth substantially more than $57,500.00
(Tr. 204 and 225). During occupancy the defendants made modest
improvements which included repainting of the kitchen and family

1
!

room (Tr. 183). After retaking possession of the premises on
June 20, 1979, plaintiff paid a sewer fee of $5.28(Exh. 6), paid

I

:i

the sum of $100.00 for cleaning ( Exh. 5), paid the sum of
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-4$7 3. 00 for fire insurance ( Exh. 3), repaired a fence for

( Tr. 168), and together with her husband, spent additiolli:I
(found by the Court to be 50 man-hours worth

$375.00) it

cleaning and making repairs to the premises ( Ex h • 7) 'In

addition, plaintiff substantially improved and bettered t[,
premises by painting of the interior ( Exh. 4) and exteric:
( Exh. 4) of the home, replacing shrubs ( Tr. 160 and &ch.
replacing utility room linoleum ( Tr. 158 and Exh. 4), inr
new carpeting ( Tr. 156 and Exh. 4) and draperies (Tr. lli
Exh. 4) ,and other miscellaneous work ( Exh. 4). These impr:
were benefits to the home and premises and resulted in pla1

the home and premises in better condition than they were il
innnediately prior to possession by defendants ( Tr. 167, ;:.

207 and 219). Prior to the purchase and possession of the'

by defendants, the landscape shrubbery was 011ergrown ( Tr. 1

the interior of the home needed paint ( Tr. 154, 181 and 1~i
the exterior paint was peeling ( Tr. 160, 182 and 222), tni

linoleum in the utility room was worn ( Tr. 158 and 181), 0

carpets were worn and showing threads ( Tr. 132, 153, 181,l

and 218) , and the draperies were dirty and too oid to be c~

( Tr. 133, 206, 209 and 218). After making these impro~e¢l

and placing the premises for sale, plaintiff quoted an ast!1
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price for theproperty of between $90,500.00 and $91,500.00
Tr. 167 and 220).
On or about June 12, 1979, plaintiff filed an unlawful

detainer action against defendants in the district of the Third
Judicial District, Salt Lake County ( R. 2). At the commencement
of trial plaintiff waived any claim for treble damages (Tr. 127).

In its Memorandum Decision the Trial Court held that plaintiff
was not entitled to an offset or recoupment for improvements
to the home and premises which were a benefit and resulted in

placing the home and premises in better condition than they
were in immediatelyprior to possession by defendants ( R. 61).
In its Memorandum Decision the Court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to damages as an offset or recoupment by reason of the
failure of defendants to make a balloon payment ( R. 61 and 62).
Said damages were set forth in the Memorandum Decision as follows:
Title insurance
Sewer Fee
Cleaning
Labor of plaintiff and husband
Fence repairs
Fire insurance on home
Fair rental value during defendants'
possession
Total

Damages

$259.00
5.28
100.00
375.00
100.00
73.00
4.983.22
$5,895.50 ( Tr. 61 &6:
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POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVID[
AND IS CONSISTENT WITH WELL RECOGNIZED CASE IAW.
A.

FORFEITURES AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

The parties to this action stipulated that defendan:~
$16,500.00 on a real estate contract with a total price(
$57,500.00 ( Exh. 1 and Tr. 126). Defendants had possess::
the property from March 10, 197 8 to June 20, 1979 ( Exh.:
Tr. 127 and 190). During that time period the defendantsl
thirteen payments of $325. 00 each or an additional sum oil
$4, 225. 00 ( Tr. 128) . The total amount paid by defendant;!'
plaintiff totaled $20, 725. 00 ( Tr. 126 and 128). The ball
payment of no less than $10, 250. 00 required to be made on

I

March 10, 1979 was not paid ( Tr. 128).

On June 12, 1979, plaintiff filed this unlawful detal

action ( R. 2). Defendants counterclaimed for the return:ll
amounts paid to plaintiff in excess of plaintiff's actual
damages on the basis of an unconscionable forfeiture (

R~

A number of Utah cases ha11e held that a liquidated·
pro11ision will not be enforced unless it bears some reasr.
relationship to the actual damages:
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" This court is committed to the doctrine, that where
the parties to a contract stipulate the amount of
liquidated damages that shall be paid in case of
breach, such stipulation is, as a general rule
enforceable, if the amount stipulated is not disproportionate to the damages actually sustained ...
" On the contrary, where enforcement of the forfeiture provision would allow an unconscionable and
exorbitant recovery, bearing no reasonable relationship to the actual damage suffered, we have uniformly
held it to be unenforceable."
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P. 2d 446, 448,
449 ( 1952)

****

**********

" It is row established in this state that where a
forfeiture provision allows an unconscionable and
exorbitant benefit to be retained by the seller
which bears no relationship to the damages which have
been sustained or reasonably could have been contemplated, it provides for a penalty or punitive damages
which courts of equity will not enforce."
Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294, 298
( 1954)

****************

"This court has long been committed to the rule that
parties to a contract may agree as to the amount of
liquidated damages that shall be paid in the case of
a breach, that the agreement is enforceable if the
amount stipulated to is not disproportionate to the
damages actually sustained. The provision in a contract
for the sale of real property that all payments which
have been made will be forfeited as liquidated damages
will not be enforced if the forfeiture would be
grossly excessive and disproportionate to any possible
loss so as to shock the conscience."
Johnson v. Carman, 572 P. 2d 371, 373 ( Utah 1977)
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I
Other cases having declared an unlawful f or f eiture :.I'

Kay y. Wood, 549 P. 2d 709 (Utah 1976), and

Call'·~
I

Corporation, 567 P. 2d 1108 (Utah 1977).
A comparison of facts in those cases and in this ca;:
reveal that these defendants have been subjected to an un·

1
I

conscionable forfeiture. In Perkins

IT.

Spencer the purck

paid $2,500.00 down on a $10,500.00 contract. The totalpaid on that contract was $2,725.00. A forfeiturewasdec
in that case based on a down payment of 23i'. and

total~

of 25%. The corresponding figures in this case show a d~.:r
ment of 28% and total payments of 36%. In fact, in noneu'
heretofore cited cases were the percentages greater tM
case. Furthermore, judgments have withstood appeal where
amount involved was much less than in this case. For exa:
in Jacobson v. Swan, this Court affirmed judgment in fav,:
the purchaser in the amount of $1,823.38 Similarly, in·
TimberL_akes Corporation, this Court found a forfeiture i!i
the total amount paid over a period of three plus years'$3, 181. 07 on a $10,000.00 contract.

In Kay

IJ,

Wood the

purchaser had made a 4% down payment, had occupancy for
year and was awarded judgment in the amount of $4,663.m.
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Plaintiff cites in her brief the case of Strand v.
Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396( 1963), but in so doing
seriously misstates the facts of that case. A reading of the
entire decision will show that the purchasers expended
$28,762.00. However, the purchasers had occupancy for 33
months and admitted that the motel had a fair rental value of
$450.00 per month or a total of $14,850.00. The fact which

.l

"r

plaintiff conveniently neglected to recite shows that the
original purchasers assigned or sold their buyer's equity to
a third party, and that they received as consideration a total
of $15,615.00. Adding the fair rental value for 33 months of
$14, 850.00 to the amount received upon resale of $15,615.00,
gives a rental value plus payments received of $30,462.00. In
the words of this Court on page 398,

11

• • •

the payments credited

and the rental value of the motel property amounts to $30,462.00,
which is $1, 699. 00 more than they have paid. 11
In her brief

the plaintiff quotes extensively from the

dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Carman. In doing so the plaintiff
cites two very old California cases. However, plaintiff has
failed to look at more recent California cases, and particularly
the leading case of Freedman v. Rector. Wardens & Vestryman of
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St. Mathias Parish, 230 P. 2d 629 ( Cal. 1951). I.n the ~.·
case, the California Supreme Court expressly reJected
reasoning of Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co
-

·•

12}

thl

Ca:

55 Pac. 713( 1898). It is of significance to note thati:~

v. Rector, Ju; tice Traynor, after discussing the basic rf

issues, relied for his primary authority upon the Utah Cil
Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 Pac. 975 ( 1923), Tu
Malmberg v. Baugh was the forerunner of Perkins
was cited with approval in the

IJ.

Spenct

latter case.

By citing authorities from states other than Utah,
plaintiff would appear to be attempting to create the ii;:
that Utah follows a minority view or that the trend of·
against reco11ery. From the authorities we find the oppo1:
be true. In Osborne

Nelson & Whitman

Real Estate Financ:

West Publishing Co., 1979, Section 3.26 at page 80, wer'
follows:
" Traditionally, installment land contract forfeitu:<
pro11isions were routinely enforced in favor of ~e,
vendor. . . . . While forfeitures are still occas1ona~,
traditionally enforced, it nevertheless can be safe~
stated that in no jurisdiction today will a 1Jendor:.
able to assume that forfeiture provisions will ~et)
automatically enforced as written. This change 15 .0·f
result of both legislative and judicial inter1Jent'. '..
.
·
· forfeit· ,
to ameliorate
the harsh impact
o f automa t ic
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Plaintiff criticizes the rule of Perkins v. Spencer, and
in so doing compares financing by real estate contract to that
of mortgages and trust deeds. In this regard it is important to
note that the foreclosure of mortgages and trust deeds are both
regulated by statute. In both instances, the vendee is given the
opportunity to bid at sale and, in effect, pay the entire outstanding balance. Under a mortgage foreclosure, the mortgagorvendee even has a right to redeem after six months. However,
the forfeiture provision in the subject contract operates as a
strict foreclosure provision without any opportunity to bid at
a judicial or public sale. It is important to note in this
regard that the subject real estate contract had been modified
so as to expressly prohibit accelerated payments ( Exh. 1).
Defendant Donald Blaine Ridd testified that he could not obtain
financing for the payment due on March 10, 1979 because he did
not hold title to the property, but could have obtained financing
for the entire outstanding balance (Tr. 202 and 203). He further
testified that plaintiff would not accept the entire unpaid
balance ( Tr. 203).
B.

DAMAGE OR LOSS RECOGNIZED AS AN OFFSET.

In Perkins v. Spencer, this Court stated that, when the
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contract provision is unenforceable, the rights of the

Pi:j1

should be adjusted by reference to damages ordinarily rec '
able. The Court proceeded to set forth the items

I

, , ....

loss to which vendors are entitled:
1

"(1) Loss of any advantageous bargain;

(2) Any damage to or depreciation of theproperty; I
(3) Any decline in value due to change in market vall
of the property not allowed for items
Nos. 1 and 2; and
(4) For the fair rental value of theproperty durind
period of occupancy.
ii
·1·

I

The total of such sums should be deducted from the:l
amount paid in, plus any improvements for which it·t~
be fair to allow recovery, and any remaining diffen::.
awarded to the plaintiffs"
1
243 P. 2d at 451
An analysis of the claims made by plaintiff will sh1.1
that they are grossly exaggerated and that they do not er,
within the purview of damages ordinarily recoverable as"
forth in Perkins
C.

11.

Spencer.

FAIR RENTAL VALUE IS CHARGED ONLY FOR Tl![

PERIOD OF OCCUPANCY.
The plaintiff has attempted to charge the defendantif
I
.,__
the fair rental value of tr~property
up t o th e time of t:1.'.I
In plaintiff's Brief at page 3 she express 1Y claims rent> I,
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" ... for twenty-five months, said time from the date of contract
until the time of trial. .. ".
The cases clearly do not permit such a computation. In
Perkins v. Spencer, this Court clearly specified that the seller's
loss

would include "

the fair rental value of the property

during the period of occupancy." ( emphasis added) In this case
the defendants were in occupancy for fifteen months and ten days,
from March 10, 1978 to June 20, 1979 ( Exh. 1, Tr. 126, 127'
andl90). Similarly, in 1 Summary of Real Proeerty Law, Brigham
Young University, 1978, at page 305, it is recited that damages
are to be ascertained by reference to "

the fair rental value

during the period of occupancy. "
In the case of Johnson v. Carman, this Court did authorize
the computation of interest in lieu of fair rental value. In
that case, the interest was computed only during the period of
occupancy. That decision states, on page 373, that the"
buyer quit the premises on May 24, 1976".

The decision continues

on the same page to approve and affirm an interest computation

fI
1

I

as follows:
" Interest on $150,000.00 to May 24, 1976,
at 812% per annum ...........•..•.. ··

$14,485.00"

In this case the only evidence of fair rental value during
the period of occupancy was between $300.00 and $325.00 per
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-14month ( Tr. 194 and 214) . Defendant Donald Blaine Ridd te
that in his opinion the fair rental value

was between t

and $325.00 (Tr. 194). Mark B. Stephens, an expert appral
called on behalf of the defendants, testified that the

r,I

··~:

rental value of the subject property during the period oi .
i
occupancy by the defendants was $325.00 per man th ( Tr. 1:.:
The plaintiff did testify that the fair rental value of fr
at the time of trial was $400. 00 to $450. 00 per month (I:
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision, expressly foi:r:I
fair rental value to be $325. 00 per month ( R. 61).
D.

INTEREST IN LIEU OF FAIR RENTAL VALUE.

As previously indicated, the case of Johnson v. Cami:
permitted the use of interest in lieu of fair rental ~alu1
However, this interest cannot be added to the fair rental
Furthermore, a careful reading of Johnson v. Carman will ,J

that interest

w8'

computed on the unpaid balance of th<

'1

at the rate specified in the contract. The method by whicti
·

interest was computed and a clear explanation that

· t was

l

1l
i

in lieu of fair rental value is found on page 374:
" Here, though, instead of using what may have been
a speculative fair market value, seller was gran~~
interest on the unpaid balance of the contract.
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per annum rate used was one agreed upon by the
parties in the contract." (Emphasis added)
572 P. 2d at 374

The use of interest in this case in lieu of fair rental
value will not appreciably alter the result. The parties
intentionally set the monthly payments of $325.00 to cover
interest accruing on the unpaid balance. Consequently, if
interest was computed on the unpaid balance of $41,000.00 at
the rate of

9~%

per annum from March 10, 1978 to June 20, 1979,

the total would be $ 4,976.94, as compated to rental of $4,983.22.
In violation of the principles set forth in Johnson v.
Carman. the plaintiff has computed the interest to be $9,800.00
(Tr. 228). An amount that great can be computed only by charging
interest on the full contract price from the possession date to
the date of trial, and this is clearly contrary ·to the law set
forth in Johnson v. Carman.

E.

DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTY IS LIMITED TO THE

COST OF RESTORING THE PROPERTY TO ITS ORIGINAL
CONDITION.
In this case the plaintiff has submitted considerable cost
data in an apparent attempt to show the cost of restoration.
However, the cost data submitted by plaintiffs is primarily for
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-16materials and labor in making substantial improvements

L

subject property. The trial court specifically found in::.
Memorandum Decision that " ... the painting and linole\llll,·

'!

the carpeting which was placed in the home greatly benefi:.:
its present 1Talue ... " and that the defendants were not tc
charged with such impro1Tements ( R. 61). On appeal the

pl~

continues in an effort to charge the defendants with the:j

I

cost of those impro1Tements. At trial the plaintiff madHi
effort to specify an amount which would restore the propd
I

its original condition, but freely admitted that the prorii
was then ( at the time of trial) in better condition than1·
first occupied by the defendants because of the new carpe:

I

paint, etc.:

"O.

In your opinion is the property at the presen:
in better condition than it was when the Rid61
I

I

moiled in?

A.

Oh, Yes.

Q.

Would it be in much better condition?

A.

Well, new carpeting, new paint jobs inside ai.r

.

out, in three rooms, that is"

( Tr.
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\
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This improvement of the property,as distinguished from a
restoration

to its original condition, was clearly not con-

templated in the authorities. The rule previously set forth
from Perkins y. Spencer specifies that the seller can offset
" any damage to ... " the property. In Johnson v. Carman, this
Court affirmed the off set of an amount determined as the " reasonable cost to restore premises". ( Emphasis added)
It should not take any further citation of authority to
understand that the plaintiff cannot charge the defendants
with the expense of placing the property in better condition than
it was in originally.

Nevertheless, because of plaintiff's

testimony, the following citations are given:
" Damages arising from temporary injury to land may be
measured by different standards, depending on the
varying circumstances of each particular case. Where
the injury to real property is merely temporary, or
where the property can be restored to its original
condition, the measure of damages can be, or should
include, the cost of repairs or restoration, as where
the injury is susceptible of remedy at a moderate or
reasonable expense and the cost of restoration may be
shown with reasonable certainty, or where the cost of
restoration is less than the diminution in the value of
the property. This is particularly true where the
adop~ion of the difference in value as the measure of
damages would be difficult and uncertain, or where the
injury is not so much to the land itself as to improvements thereon. The recovery is limited to the cost of
restoring the premises to their original condition. and
does not extend to that of placing them in better
condition than there were in originally.
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-18"The cost of restoration, however cannot be ad '
'
opte I
as the measure of damages where the cost of restori:
th~ ~roperty ~o~ld exceed the value thereof in its ·1
original condition, or the depreciation in the vab
thereof, or the actual damage sustained by plaint':.
or where restoration is impracticable." ( Emphasi:·;j
25 C.J.S., Damages, Sec. 84.
·1

*****************************
"One of the two rules of damages used most often in!
measuring recovery for injury to a building or
structure is the cost of restoring that building or.
structure to its condition irmnediately prior to the i
injury." (Emphasis added )
22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, Sec. 140.

*******************************
"One group of cases measures damages by the value of '
the fixture in its condition at the time of removal
or destruction. These cases value the fixtures asa
part of the real estate and not at its second hand r
A second group of cases holds that the measure of'
for wrongful injury to or removal of fixtures is the
cost of repairs or the cost of restoring the propert;
to its condition irmnediately prior to the wrongful«:
( Emphasis added).
22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, Sec. 1.:,
In this case the plaintiff submitted cost data for rri~
and labor in making substantial improvements on the subjeii
property. This

brief will not discuss each and every

itd

only those inoolving the greater expense. It is sub•itt"·!
ever, that most other items ( except those approved by the:

I

court in its Memorandum Decision )ire in this same categor:I
improvements. In considering these items it should be not'·.
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-19the original portion of the home was built in approximately
1911 ( Tr. 152).

The largest item is for the interior and exterior paint.
The testimony is undisputed that the exterior of the home was
badly in need of paint at the time defendants took possession
(Tr. 160, 182 and 222).

Mrs. Soffe admitted on cross examination

that, at the time defendants took possession, the exterior paint
was peeling ( Tr. 152 and 160) and that paint was needed in the
living room

Tr. 154).

Another major item is the new carpet placed in the

living

room, dining room and small bedroom. Again, the evidence is
undisputed that the existing carpet was worn to the point of
showing threads ( Tr. 132, 153, 181, 206, and 218). The plaintiff's
son, Dr. Alder, testified that he had seen threads in the carpet
prior to possession by the defendants (Tr. 132), and the
plaintiff herself testified that there could have been threads
or jute showing ( Tr. 153 and 154). Plaintiff further testified
that the

new carpeting was better than the carpet existing prior

to possession by the defendants ( Tr. 156). There was also
testimony that the carpet in place at the time defendants took
possession was at least 18 years old( Tr. 219).
Another major item is the draperies. There was a dispute
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in the testimony as to whether the original draperi· es wer. '
wa-shable, but Dr. Alder conceded that the drapes were not
(Tr. 133). Defendants' witnesses, including an experienc;i
dry-cleaner, testified that the draperies were dirty and:l
not

withstand cleaning ( Tr. 206, 209, and 218). Furthet

testimony was undisputed that the drapes were stored in

J

basement and were still available when plaintiff retook
possession ( Tr. 159 and 187). Plaintiff now seeks to charj
'

the defendants with the cost of new draperies in the livir
and family rooms ( Brief at p. 3 and Exh. 4).

· t h e new 1.ino 1 eum in
· t h e uti·1·ity rooi. I
Ano th er l.·t em is
Plaintiff seeks to charge the defendants with the cost of·
placing new linoleum ( Brief at p. 3 andExh. 4). However,
on cross examination plaintiff admitted that the

I

linole\lll~

the utility room was worn before the defendants m01ed in
( Tr. 158) . Defendant Donald Blaine Ridd gave a more thori1
description of the utility room floor upon taking occupanc:
"The floor in the utility room was spongy because of
the leak at some point in time that had continueddt~
leak on that spot causing the floor to rot out an )!'
was no asbestos tile on that part of the floor at a·
( Tr. 181)
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-21The plaintiff seeks to charge the defendants with the
purchase of some 12 to 15 shrubs ( Brief at p. 3, Tr. 160 and
Exh. 5). Dr. Alder testified on cross examinatbn that the
existing shrubs were overgrown at the time defendants took
possession (Tr. 134). Defendant Donald Blaine Ridd testified
that he pruned one shrub back to the edge of the sidewalk
(Tr. 188). Because the shrubs were overgrown through
several years of non-pruning, the pruning did expose some dead
undergrowth ( Tr. 188). Plaintiff admitted on cross examination
that the 12 to 15 shrubs replaced was in excess of the number
pruned

by defendants (Tr. 161).

Another significant item was the charge for trash cleanup.
It is clear from the testimony of plail.tiff that the trash hauled
included the 12 to 15 shrubs which were removed by plaintiff
after retaking possession (Tr. 165). Dr. Alder testified on
behalf of the plaintiff that there was debris in the yard when
he inspected the property on June 19th (Tr. 131). Plaintiff
introduced Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 11 which showed garbage piled
in the yard. Plaintiff variously testified that those pictures
were taken on June 22nd ( Tr. 145 and 146) and on June 19th
(Tr. 148).

Plaintiff testified that she was responsible for
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hauling away the garbage shown in Exhibits 8 through 11
( Tr. 146), but she also admitted that defendants did ac:.
cleaning subsequent to the time the pictures were taken
( Tr. 148 and

149) .

Defendant Donald Blaine Ridd te;:

1

that valuable possessions were removed on June 19th and:
all of the garbage depicted in Exhibits 8 through 11

wa~

removed by him on June 20th ( Tr. 190). The father of

Mr.

Ridd also testified that he personally helped haul away,
garbage depicted in Exhibits 8 through 11 ( Tr. 224).
Three witnesses testified on behalf of the defendant
that the premises were in better condition on June 20, l!
than they were when possession was taken on March 10, H:
( Tr. 204, 207 and 219).

Perhaps the most compelling evU

that the expenditures were primarily for improvements to:
property comes from plaintiff herself. Plaintiff testifie:I
cross examination that she had asked $90,500.00 for tbei:I
property after the defendants had vacated and the expendi:l
had been made ( Tr. 167) . One of the defendants' witnesse:
testified that plaintiff had quoted an asking price of
$91,500.00 ( Tr. 220).
Plaintiff apparently attempts to duplicate or double!
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-23asserted costs of improvements by claiming a diminution in
~alue

of the subject property. Plaintiff apparently claims

that the premises had a fair market value of $50,000.00 at
the time she retook possession, resulting in a diminution
of $7,500.00 (Brief at p. 5). Such an assertion can find no
support in the record. On cross examination defendant Donald
Blaine Ridd did testify that the property could be sold for
$50,000.00 in the same sense that it could also be sold for
$20,000.00 (Tr.

199). However, he also testified that upon

his departure the property was worth a substantial amount more
than $57,SOO.OO (Tr. 225). The plaintiff produced no

monetary

evidence whatsoever of any diminished fair market value. In any
event, a diminution in fair market value would represent a
duplication of the figures given by plaintiff for the making
of improvements. The plaintiff certainly cannot measure damage
by diminution in fair market value and then add to that the
cost of any supposed restoration or improvement.
The plahtiff erroneously characterizes this claimed
diminution as " loss of bargain " ( Brief at p. 5). There is
absolutely no testimony which would support such a claim for
loss of an advantageous bargaining. Loss of an advantageous
bargain results in this context when a property is sold for an
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-24amount in excess of its then fair market value. ( See Co:

_,_

Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300P.2d 623 ( 1956), where thee~.
found the loss of an advantageous bargain within the mea:
of Perkins v. Spencer. In that case the buyer agreed to:
double the value of the real estate.) In this case the
plaintiff responded on cross examination that the fair ::i.f
value of the property at the time of sale to the defenda:
was $57, 500. 00 ( Tr. 165). That figure is also the contr:
price ( Exh. 1) . Furthermore, to determine whether the i~
claimed the loss of an advantageous bargain, defendants4
in Interrogatory No. 7 as to the fair market value of th1
subject property on the date of contract. The plaintiff':
response was $57,500.00 ( R. 30).

E.

ATTORNEY' FEE

Four Utah cases bear on the issue of an attorney's;,,
The case of Jacobson IT· Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294,I
( 1954), was an unlawful detainer action where the

underi~)

Uniform Real Esta te Contract provided for an attorney

I5

f'

In denying the seller an attorney's fee, this Court said:
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" Plaintiffs are not entitled to reco11er attorney's
fees. In Forrester v. Cook the contract pro11ided
the same as here that the purchaser agreed to pay
all costs and expenses'which may arise from enforcing this agreement, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.'
"There we held that an action in unlawful detainer
was to enforce the right given by statute and not
to enforce the provision of the contract. Under this
decision the only part of this judgment in plaintiffs'
favor is to award them possession of the property and
damages for holding over. This case is governed by that
decision"
The case of Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 Pac. 206,

213 ( 1930), in11olved

a real estate contract with language

nearly identical to that of the current Uniform Real Estate
Contract. In an unlawful detainer action, this Court held
as follows:
"The contract between the parties hereto pro11ides
for an attorney's fee in ' enforcing this agreement.'
This is not an action to enforce the agreement. Plaintiff
has proceeded upon the theory that the agreement fixed
the status of the parties after forfeiture and that
thereupon defendants became tenants at will. Upon the
giving of the notice required by the statute this
tenancy ceased,and thereafter defendants held possession
of the premises unlawfully. The action is summary and
limited and is one for reco11ery of possession of
property and damages because of the unlawful detention.
No attempt is made to enforce any of the pro11isions of
the contract. The action is not one on contract. The
law and not the contract fixes the measure of damages.
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No provision is made in the law for an attorney's
fee in this sort of action."
In Johnson v. Carman the Court did affirm a case
which included an offset of $1,165.00 for an attorney's
However, it nrost be recognized that the Johnson "· Carrr.:

t

was not an unlawful detainer action. In that case suit ·o:
brought by the contract buyer.
This case was and is an unlawful detainer action oi:J
by the plaintiff with a counterclaim by the defendants.::
the case law it is clear that the plaintiff is entitledil
offset for an attorney's fee in prosecuting this unlawfu:
detainer action. In this regard it should be noted that:
plaintiff retook possession on June 20, 1979 ( Tr. 127 anl
shortly after the Complaint was filed on June 12, 1979 ! I
Upon retaking possession, the plaintiff would undoubted!:•
been content to dismiss the entire lawsuit. This point •~ii
clear at the time of trial when plaintiff's counsel waivd
claim to treble damages and any reliance upon notices pur:l
given ( Tr. 127). However, the plaintiff was unable to

di~

her Complaint because the defendants filed an Answer and

1

claim on June 15, 1979 ( R. 13). It is submittedthatpla:>
is entitled to no attorney's fee for defending against
defendants' Counterclaim.
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In any event, the trial court has discretion in awarding
attorney's fees. In F\illmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah
1976), the plaintiff-vendor brought an action to quiet title
and to declare forfeiture under a Uniform Real Estate Contract.
In that case the trial court held for the plaintiff but failed
to award attorney's fees. The Fullmer case differs from the
case at issue because in this case the defendants prevailed on
the merits and there is consequently less justification for
awarding plahtiff an attorney's fee. In holding that the
plaintiff-vendor was not entitled to an attorney's fee this
Court used the following language:
"The final issue to be considered is the plaintiffs'
contention by way of cross-appeal, that the trial
court erred in refusing to award attorneys' fees
pursuant to the terms of the uniform real estate
contract . . . . A suit of this nature involving
invocation of a forfeiture and/or the enforcement of
a purchase contract invokes consideration of the
principles of equity which address themselves to the
conscience and discretion of the trial court .... In
view of these circumstances we are not pursuaded that
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to require defendant to pay the plaintiffs' attorney's
fees."
546 P. 2d at 610
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CONCIDSION

It is respectfully submitted that the trial court1s
decision is supported by facts in e11idence and by the wel:
recognized decisions of this Court.
Respectfully submitted,

Or11al C. Harrison
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